W.C. No. 4-811-996.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
June 14, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Jones (ALJ) dated December 13, 2010 that denied and dismissed the claim. We affirm.
A hearing was held on the issues whether Colorado has jurisdiction over this claim and, if so, whether the claimant was entitled to medical benefits and to temporary total disability benefits. Following the hearing the ALJ entered findings of fact that for the purposes of this order may be summarized as follows. The claimant began his employment with this employer on October 4, 2009 and on December 2, 2009 he sustained injuries while working as a rig hand in Wyoming. The employer operates oil and gas wells in Wyoming and New Mexico and the employer’s rig supervisor was Inocencio Ramos, who had the authority to hire new employees. Ramos telephoned the claimant, who resided in Colorado, and offered him a job. Ramos informed the claimant that prior to his hire he would have to go to Ramos’s house in Wyoming to complete certain paperwork. On October 3, 2009 the claimant went to Ramos’s house in Wyoming and completed the paperwork. Ramos and the claimant then drove to the rig in Wyoming where the claimant began working. The claimant performed all his work in Wyoming and did not work at all in Colorado.
The ALJ also found that when Ramos completed a “field hire” he transmitted the paperwork to the comptroller, Mary Ellen Condon, who worked in the employer’s office in Colorado. She then created a personnel file and submitted the information to a third-party payroll company. There was no requirement that anyone in the company approve
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the hiring decisions of Ramos. Here, the ALJ found that the claimant was hired when he completed and submitted the paperwork to Ramos at the latter’s residence.
The ALJ concluded that since the contract of hire occurred in Wyoming rather than in Colorado and since the claimant performed no work in Colorado, this state has no jurisdiction over the claim. Accordingly, she dismissed the claim.
The claimant appealed the ALJ’s order and disputes the factual finding that the contract of hire was completed in Wyoming rather than in Colorado. He argues in this regard that he was hired when he accepted Ramos’s offer by telephone in Colorado and negotiated the terms of his employment. However, we are not persuaded that the ALJ erred or abused her discretion.
Colorado jurisdiction over injuries suffered outside of the state is conferred by statute. Section 8-41-204, C.R.S. provides that Colorado has jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries if the employee was “hired or is regularly employed in this state.” Whether an employee was “hired . . . in this state” is a contract question generally governed by the same rules as other contracts. Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman, 134 Colo. 586, 407 P.2d 805 (1957). The essential elements of a contract are competent parties, subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation. Id. The place of contracting is generally determined by the parties’ intention, and is usually the place where the offer is accepted, or the last act necessary to the meeting of the minds or to complete the contract is performed. The ultimate criterion of the place where the contract is deemed to have been made is the place where the last act necessary to complete it was done. Id.
The question of whether the claimant has proven the existence of a contract for hire is one of fact for determination by the ALJ Rocky Mountain Dairy Products v. Pease, 161 Colo. 216, 422 P.2d 630 (1967). Similarly, the nature of the last act necessary to complete the contract and its location are generally factual questions for the ALJ’s resolution. Because these questions are factual in nature, we are bound by the ALJ’s determinations in this regard if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 38-43-304(8), C.R.S. 2009; Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo. App. 1998). Substantial evidence is probative evidence which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences See F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717
P.2d 965 (Colo. App. 1985). The substantial evidence standard requires that we view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo. App. 2003).
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Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings that the contract of hire was created in Wyoming. The ALJ found that Ramos informed the claimant that prior to his hire he would have to travel to Wyoming to Ramos’s residence and complete paperwork needed to finalize his hire. The claimant did so and these findings are sufficient to support the inference that the contract of hire was created in Wyoming.
Further, we are unpersuaded by the claimant’s argument that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard in determining the site of the contract of hire. In this regard, the claimant argues that the contract of hire was essentially completed when Ramos offered the claimant work during the parties’ telephone conversation and the claimant accepted the offer. The claimant argues that despite the need to “finalize” details of the agreement, there was the necessary “meeting of the minds” at the time of the telephone conversation to complete the contract. Here, the ALJ expressly found that Ramos advised the claimant that before he could “actually hire and put him to work” the paperwork needed to be completed in Wyoming. Ramos further advised him that he would not be considered an employee until the paperwork was completed. Whether or not the ALJ could have weighed the evidence differently and inferred that a contract of hire was completed earlier, she was not compelled to do so. Because her factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and because they, in turn, support her legal conclusions, we must affirm the order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated December 13, 2010, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Curt Kriksciun
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JOSUE RUIZ, DENVER, CO, (Claimant).
RICHARDSON OPERATING COMPANY, Attn: MARY ELLEN CONDON, DENVER, CO, (Employer).
FIREMANS FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Attn: ANGELA KITTS, C/O: GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, ENGLEWOOD, CO, (Insurer).
THE FRICKEY LAW FIRM, Attn: JANET L. FRICKEY, ESQ., LAKEWOOD, CO, (For Claimant).
RITSEMA LYON, PC, Attn: ELIOT J. WIENER, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
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