W.C. No. 4-232-993Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 24, 1996
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Wheelock (ALJ) dated April 30, 1996, which required them to pay temporary disability benefits. The respondents contend that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant suffered a compensable injury. We disagree, and therefore, affirm.
On March 3, 1995, the ALJ entered an order in which she found that the claimant suffered a compensable injury on July 29, 1994, arising out of and in the course of his employment at the Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region (Humane Society). In support, the ALJ found that the claimant was employed by the Humane Society as a dispatcher. On July 29, 1994, the claimant was wearing his Humane Society uniform, displaying a Humane Society badge and driving a Humane Society vehicle when he was injured in an automobile accident. The ALJ found that, on the day of the accident, the claimant had been given permission to use the Humane Society vehicle to conduct some personal business at the courthouse over his lunch hour. On the way to the courthouse the claimant stopped at the City Marshall’s office to check for subpoenas. The auto accident occurred while the claimant was driving back to the Humane Society.
The respondents timely appealed the ALJ’s order. However, the March 3 order neither awarded or denied the claimant a benefit or penalty. Therefore, we concluded that the March 3 order was an interlocutory order which was not subject to review. Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). Consequently, we dismissed the respondents’ petition to review without prejudice.
Thereafter, the ALJ entered her order of April 30, which is a final order on the issue of compensability. The respondents timely appealed the April 30 order, and the matter has been transmitted to us for review.
The respondents contend that the ALJ’s findings of fact are insufficient to permit appellate review of their contention that the claimant was not within the course of his employment at the time of the injury. Further, the respondents argue that the ALJ’s order is not supported by the applicable law. We disagree.
The ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in articulating her findings of fact. George v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 624 (Colo.App. 1986). Rather, the ALJ’s findings of fact are sufficient if the basis of the ALJ’s award is apparent. Riddle v. Ampex Corp., 839 P.2d 489
(Colo.App. 1992); Boice v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 800 P.2d 1339 (Colo.App. 1990).
Admittedly, the ALJ’s March 3 order does not contain extensive findings of fact. However, the findings are sufficient for us to ascertain the evidence the ALJ found dispositive of her determination that the claimant was injured in the course and scope of his employment.
Furthermore, the fact that the ALJ did not discuss the “legal theory” upon which she relied to find that the claimant suffered a compensable injury, does not render the order insufficient for appellate review. To the contrary, the pertinent question is whether the ALJ’s order is consistent with the applicable law, and we can resolve that question based upon the ALJ’s factual determinations. Cf. Industrial Commission v. Rowe, 162 Colo. 248, 425 P.2d 274 (1967) (ALJ’s findings of fact not conclusions of law binding on appeal); Therefore, we are not compelled to remand the matter for additional findings. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S.( 1996 Cum. Supp.).
Implicitly crediting the claimant’s testimony, the ALJ found that picking up subpoenas from the City Marshall’s office was a regular and required part of the claimant’s employment duties. Consequently, the ALJ’s findings reflect her determination that the claimant was partially performing the duties of his regular employment, and not acting for his sole benefit at the time of the accident. In other words, the ALJ has determined that the claimant actions served a “dual purpose” which conferred a benefit on the employer.
Under the “dual purpose” doctrine, an injury suffered by an employee while performing acts for the mutual benefit of the employer and the employee are usually compensable. Deterts v. Times Publishing Co., 38 Colo. App. 48, 552 P.2d 1033
(1976); Berry’s Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Palomba, 161 Colo. 369, 423 P.2d 2 (1967); Colorado Civil Air Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194 (Colo.App. 1983). For example i Bob Hagestad Porsche Audi Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 503 P.2d 628 (Colo.App. 1972) (not selected for publication) the service manager for an automobile dealer suffered compensable injuries while driving a customer’s vehicle home from a friend’s home. The service manager took the vehicle home from work to road test it under actual traffic conditions. Because road testing vehicles was a duty within the service manager’s scope of employment, the court held that the service manager conferred a benefit on the employer by driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Therefore, the service manager’s injuries were held to be compensable under the “dual purpose” doctrine.
Here, the ALJ found that the claimant was performing a duty which benefitted the Humane Society at the time of the injury. Under these conditions, the “dual benefit” doctrine is applicable and the claimant’s injury is compensable.
In reaching this conclusion we recognize that an injury occurring during the violation of a direct order by the employer does not fall within the course of employment merely because the employee acted with the intent of benefitting the employe Bill Lawley Ford v. Miller, 672 P.2d 1031 (Colo.App. 1983). However, if the employer’s order is so general that it is outweighed by the specific benefits which flow to the employer by its violation, the injury will nevertheless be considered to be within the course of employment. Maintenance Management Inc. v. Tinkle, 40 Colo. App. 80, 570 P.2d 840 (1977).
As argued by the respondents, the employer in Bill Lawley Ford expressly instructed its employee to remain in Grand Junction for the night and not to drive to Meeker. Consequently, the court held that the employee exceeded his limited sphere of employment when he was injured while driving to Meeker that night.
Unlike the facts in Bill Lawley Ford, there is no evidence in this case that the Humane Society forbade the claimant stopping at the City Marshall’s office. To the contrary, the employer’s witness testified that he had no reason to believe the claimant was not within the course of his employment at the time of the injury. (Tr. p. 34). Furthermore, the fact that the Humane Society did not know that the claimant would be using the vehicle to check for subpoenas is not the equivalent of a direct order prohibiting the claimant from doing so. Under these circumstances, we reject the respondents’ argument that the Humane Society expressly limited the claimant’s sphere of employment so as to preclude the claimant from driving to the City Marshall’s office on July 29. See Maintenance Management Inc. v. Tinkle, supra.
Moreover, the respondents’ reliance upon Rogers v. Industrial Commission, 574 P.2d 116 (Colo.App. 1978), is misplaced. Rogers is factually distinguishable Rogers involved a police officer who was injured while riding his personal vehicle to work. Unlike the ALJ’s findings of fact in this matter, the police officer was not performing a “dual purpose” at the time of the injury, even though his job required him to respond to emergencies. This is true because the officer was not actually responding to an emergency at the time of the accident. Under these circumstances, the injuries were governed by the general rule that injuries incurred while “going to and coming from” work are not sustained in the course of employment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 30, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed October 24, 1996 to the following parties:
Robert Capalety, 13525 Falcon Hwy., Falcon, CO 80831
The Humane Society of the Pikes Peak Region, 633 S. 8th St., Colorado Springs, CO 80906
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Curt Kriksciun, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Keith F. Cross, Esq., 101 N. Cascade Ave., Ste. 400, Colo. Springs, Co. 80903 (For the Claimant)
BY: _______________________