W.C. No. 3-115-275Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
February 5, 1998
ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ), dated August 22, 1997, which requires them to pay medical benefits, including benefits for psychological treatment. We dismiss the petition to review without prejudice.
This matter was before us previously. See Boan v. Senior Housing Options, Inc., W.C. No. 3-115-275 (March 31, 1997). At that time, we considered the ALJ’s order of October 31, 1996, and ruled that the ALJ properly denied temporary total disability benefits after May 3, 1995. We upheld the denial because the authorized treating physician placed the claimant at maximum medical improvement (MMI) on May 3, and because the claimant failed to request a Division-sponsored independent medical examination (IME) on the issue of MMI prior to the IME on permanent impairment. We note that our order was subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals. See Boan v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, (Colo.App. No. 97CA0698, November 13, 1997) (not selected for publication). However, the court also remanded with directions to consider the “reasonableness and necessity of medical benefits,” including whether or not the claimant “needed further care because of the effects of the work-related injury on her preexisting psychiatric condition.”
Prior to the decision of the court of appeals, the ALJ held a hearing on July 1, 1997. At that time, the ALJ considered the claimant’s entitlement to additional medical benefits, and whether she is entitled to additional temporary disability benefits because she was not at MMI on May 3, 1995.
In the order dated August 22, 1997, the ALJ denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits subsequent to May 3. The ALJ found that the treating physician had not retracted his opinion that the claimant reached MMI on May 3, and noted that “a Division IME may not be legally possible under the terms of the ICAP decision dated March 31, 1997.” The ALJ went on to find that the claimant has a “psychological overlay” as a result of the compensable injury, and is entitled to treatment for that condition. Further, the ALJ concluded that the claimant needs continuing medical care for her physical injury pursuant to Grover v. Industrial Commission, 759 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1988).
On review, the respondents contend that the ALJ’s order is “subject to two interpretations.” The respondents assert that, on the one hand, the order may be interpreted as awarding medical benefits for treatment of the claimant’s psychological condition pursuant to Grover v. Industrial Commission, supra. The respondents have no objection to this interpretation. Alternatively, the respondents argue that the order may be interpreted as “holding that the claimant was not at MMI as a result of the psychological impairment.” The respondents assert that if the later interpretation of the order is correct, it is erroneous. Thus, the respondents ask us to modify or clarify the order with respect to whether the claimant is at MMI for the psychological overlay. We conclude that the order is interlocutory with respect to the issue raised by the respondents.
Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1997, provides that a party may file a petition to review concerning an order which requires the payment of a penalty or benefits, or denies the claimant any benefits or penalty. Orders which do not require the payment of benefits or penalties, or deny the claimant benefits or penalties, are interlocutory and not subject to review. Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App. 1989). Moreover, orders may be partially final and reviewable, and partially interlocutory. See Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843 (Colo.App. 1989).
Here, the respondents concede that their “appeal is only necessary if the ALJ’s order is construed as setting aside [the prior determination of] MMI.” Thus, the respondents have no specific objection to the award of medical benefits. They do not deny that psychological treatment is reasonable and necessary, or that they are liable to pay for it. To the contrary, the respondents’ only concern with the order pertains to its possible implications should the claimant seek additional benefits in the future.
Under these circumstances, the respondents’ appeal from the order is interlocutory because it does not dispute the actual award of benefits. Any ruling which we might make concerning the proper interpretation of the ALJ’s order would be purely prospective, and would not alter the respondents’ current liability. Consequently, we conclude that the disputed issue in interlocutory, and not currently subject to review. The respondents may, of course, raise the issue should it become relevant at some point in the future.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents’ petition to review the ALJ’s order dated August 22, 1997, is dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL ________________________________ David Cain ________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
An action to modify or vacate the Order may be commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1997.
Copies of this decision were mailed February 5, 1998 to the following parties:
Rondelle D. Boan, P.O. Box 1166, Dolores, CO 81323
Senior Housing Options, Inc., 1660 Wynkoop St., Ste. 850, Denver, CO 80202-1145
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Curt Kriksciun, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
DOLE-DOWC, IME Unit, Attn: Fay Boyd (Interagency Mail)
Kendra Oyen, Esq., 744 Horizon Ct., Ste. 360, Grand Junction, CO 81506 (For the Respondents)
Robert C. Dawes, Esq., 572 E. Third Ave., Durango, CO 81301 (For the Claimant)
By: ________________________________