W.C. No. 4-669-808.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 8, 2007.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) dated September 22, 2006 that denied and dismissed his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
This matter proceeded to a hearing for the determination of several issues, including the compensability of the claim. Several of the ALJ’s findings are summarized as follows. The claimant passed out fliers at a shopping center. He worked from 9:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. However, on November 15, 2005, he arranged to leave work early. He slipped and fell on ice at about 1:50 p.m. The claimant received medical treatment at a hospital on the day of the accident, where the employer requested that he submit to a urinalysis. The claimant did not provide a urine sample. The next day he complained to his employer about being requested to provide a urine sample for drug testing and stated that the accident and injury were not related to work. He also claimed that he was not on the company clock when the accident happened. The claimant later advised the employer that he was “playing around” when he fell and, again, stated that he had not been working at the time of the accident.
The ALJ was not persuaded that the claimant’s fall and corresponding injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. She therefore determined that the claimant failed to establish that he had sustained a compensable injury and dismissed his claim.
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The claimant has not provided a brief or a transcript in support of his appeal. Instead, he makes only general allegations of error under § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. Nonetheless, we find no reversible error. See Ortiz v. Industrial Comm’n, 734 P.2d 642 (Colo.App. 1986) (issue raised in petition for review but not argued in brief not abandoned).
The claimant had the burden to prove that his alleged disability was proximately caused by an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2006. Whether the claimant met that burden of proof is a factual question for resolution by the ALJ, and his determination must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App. 1998). Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo.App. 1995).
Under this standard of review it is the ALJs sole prerogative to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value of the evidence. The substantial evidence standard requires that we view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ’s assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Thus, the scope of our review is “exceedingly narrow.”Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, supra. This narrow standard of review also requires that we defer to the ALJ’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo.App. 2003). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ unless the testimony the ALJ found persuasive is rebutted by such hard, certain evidence that it would be error as a matter of law to credit the testimony. Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571
(Colo. 1986). The existence of evidence which, if credited, might permit a contrary result also affords no basis for relief on appeal Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo.App. 2002). Moreover, in the absence of a transcript we are required to presume that the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Nova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 800 (Colo.App. 1988). The findings made by the ALJ support her conclusion that the claimant failed to establish a compensable injury. We therefore decline to disturb the ALJ’s decision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated September 22, 2006, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
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_____________________________ John D. Baird
_____________________________ Thomas Schrant
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Lawrence Billups, Centennial, CO, Goals Inc. d/b/a TPM Staffing Services Kathryn Nibler, Castle Rock, CO, Pinnacol Assurance Harvey D. Flewelling, Esq., Denver, CO, Law Offices of O’Toole Sbarbaro, P.C. Neil D. O’Toole, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
Ritsema Lyon, P.C. Charlotte Veaux, Esq., Colorado Springs, CO, (For Respondents).
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