W.C. No. 3-906-548Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
July 6, 1994
Final Order
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Barringer (ALJ) which determined that his claim was closed by a final admission of liability and denied the claimant’s petition to reopen. We affirm.
In August 1991, the respondents filed a Final Admission of Liability which admitted for maximum permanent partial disability benefits, and “medical to date” in the amount of $15,744.44. In accordance with section 8-43-203(2), C.R.S. (1993 Cum. Supp.), the admission contained a “notice to claimant” concerning the finality of the admission and advising the claimant of his right to object to the admission.
The claimant did not object to the final admission but applied for a lump sum award. The lump sum was granted on January 10, 1992. However, in November 1992, the claimant filed a Petition to Reopen the Claim, asserting a change in physical condition as well as “error” and “mistake.”
At the hearing, the claimant testified that his physical condition had worsened since the final admission, and that he needed additional medical care. He further testified that he was “confused” about the effect of the final admission, and desired additional benefits. Specifically, the claimant testified that he was unaware that he might be entitled to permanent total disability benefits, and had not been advised of this fact by the respondent’s adjuster. Further, he testified that he was unaware of his right to “future medical benefits.” (Tr. p. 11). The claimant admitted he was not represented by counsel at the time the final admission was filed.
Relying upon a medical report of Dr. Carlton, dated April 28, 1993, the ALJ rejected the claimant’s assertion that his condition had physically worsened. Further, the ALJ rejected the argument that there was an “error” or “mistake” which would justify reopening the claim. Specifically, the ALJ found that the respondents had not committed a “fraud” in their dealings with the claimant and were not obliged to advise him of all possible rights under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Further, the court noted that the claimant was “not represented by an attorney and had chose [sic] not to hire an attorney to represent him in this matter at that time.” Consequently, the ALJ concluded that there was not a “mutual mistake or error,” nor was there a “mistake of fact or mistake of law.” (Conclusions of Law, 3, 14).
I.
On review, the claimant first asserts that the ALJ did not consider his argument concerning error and mistake. Alternatively, the claimant argues that ALJ misapplied the law in holding that his “mistaken” understanding concerning the finality of the admission and his ignorance of his rights to claim permanent total disability and ongoing medical benefits, do not constitute “mistakes of fact or law” sufficient to justify reopening the claim. The claimant also asserts that his ignorance vitiated the finality of the respondents’ final admission, because his failure to object to the admission was not “voluntary, knowing and intelligent.” We reject these arguments.
Claimant’s argument notwithstanding, we do not believe that the ALJ failed to consider whether his alleged ignorance of the finality provisions of the Act, and of his rights to claim benefits, justified a reopening of the claim. Rather, we understand the ALJ to have found that the claimant was presumed to have the required legal knowledge, and to the extent he did not, he could have rectified the problem by obtaining the services of an attorney before deciding whether or not to object to the final admission.
In our view, these findings by the ALJ support the denial of the petition to reopen bases on “mistake or error.” It is true, as the claimant argues, that a mistake in the interpretation or understanding of the law may justify an ALJ in exercising his discretion to grant a petition to reopen. See Standard Metals Corp. v. Gallegos, 781 P.2d 142
(Colo.App. 1989). However, to the extent an error or mistake exists, an ALJ is given wide discretion in determining whether the error or mistake is sufficient to warrant reopening of the claim. Standard Metals Corp.v. Gallegos, supra. To the extent a party receives notice that it may be held liable under the Act but, through inaction, permits a final judgment to be entered, an ALJ need not determine that such inaction constitutes an error or mistake which justifies reopening. See Klosterman v.Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 873 (Colo.App. 1984).
Further, as the ALJ recognized, pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the statute under which they seek benefits. Paul v.Industrial Commission, 632 P.2d 638 (Colo.App. 1981). They are not entitled to any special treatment in the application of procedural rules, and they assume responsibility for the consequences of their mistakes. Manka v. Martin, 200 Colo. 260, 614 P.2d 875 (1980).
Here, the ALJ determined that, if the claimant entertained any misunderstanding concerning the finality provisions or his substantive rights, that misunderstanding did not rise to the level of a “mistake” or “error” which would justify reopening the claim. In our view, this determination is fully within the ALJ’s discretion since the claimant elected to proceed pro se, and did not seek the assistance of an attorney when confronted with a final admission which, on its face, advised him that the case would “automatically be closed” unless he objected.
Further, the claimant does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that the respondents’ adjusters did not commit fraud or act in bad faith when negotiating with the claimant. It may be true, as the claimant argues, that the respondents’ adjusters had a better understanding of the Act than he did. However, we do not think the mere existence of such an inequality of knowledge required the ALJ to find that there was an error or mistake sufficient to reopen the claim.
For essentially the same reasons, we reject the claimant’s argument that his failure to object to the final admission did not constitute a voluntary, knowing and intelligent “waiver” of his rights. The respondents’ final admission of liability was filed in compliance with the procedures established by section 8-43-203(2). The claimant was presumed to know the ramifications of section 8-43-203(2) and, therefore, must be presumed to have waived his rights by failing to object. Mankav. Martin, supra; Paul v. Industrial Commission, supra.
Claimant’s reliance upon Johnson v. McDonald, 697 P.2d 810 (Colo.App. 1985), is misplaced. Johnson was decided prior to the enactment of specific regulations and statutes, such as section 8-43-203(2), governing the filing of final admissions of liability. Johnson itself recognized this distinction and cannot be read as authority for vitiating section 8-43-203(2).
II.
The claimant also suggests that, to the extent the final admission of liability is effective, it did not serve to close his right to claim ongoing medical benefits. The claimant argues that, because the final admission refers to “medical to date,” the admission cannot fairly be read to foreclose his right to claim future medical benefits. We disagree.
In Dalco Industries v. Garcia, 867 P.2d 156 (Colo.App. 1993), the Court of Appeals interpreted section 8-43-203(2) as providing for “continuing jurisdiction over any issue not specifically addressed
in a non-contested final admission of liability.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the court held that a final admission of liability did not foreclose the issue of penalties where the admission was “limited to an admission for temporary impairment and partial disability benefits.”
However, in this case, the respondents’ final admission specifically addressed the “issue” of medical benefits and advised the claimant that, unless he objected, the claim would be closed as to the “issues admitted.” Here, there was an admission for medical benefits and, by operation of section 8-43-203(2), the claim is “automatically closed” as to that issue. This is not a case, as was Dalco Industries, where the respondents failed to address a particular form of benefit. Compare Friesv. Foothills Care Center, W.C. 3-990-704, April 7, 1994 (where respondents’ final admission contained the notation, “Amount of Penalties Paid $ None,” the respondents had “admitted” for penalty under section 8-43-203(2) and the “issue” was closed absent a petition to reopen).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated July 30, 1993, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date this order was mailed, pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed July 6, 1994 to the following parties:
Wallace W. Bast, P.O. Box 334, Walsenburg, CO 91055.
Mountain Services, Inc., Resort Box 3, Cuchara, CO 81055.
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: C.A. Boyd, Esq. Interagency Mail.
Michael W. Seckar, Esq., 201 W. 8th St., #525, Pueblo, CO 81003 (For the Claimant).
By: Teddy Jenkin