W.C. Nos. 4-221-429 4-221-033Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 6, 2001
ORDER OF REMAND
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Harr (ALJ Harr) which denied the claimant’s “Motion for Entry of Final Order or for De Novo Hearing.” We set the order aside and remand for further proceedings.
The parties do not dispute most of the pertinent facts. The claimant filed two claims for benefits alleging an injury to his right hand on January 14, 1994, and injuries to his legs, knees and back on May 21, 1994. The claim for the January 14 injury was assigned W.C. No. 4-221-033, and the claim for the May 21 injuries was assigned W.C. No. 4-221-429. The claimant also alleged that he experienced depression as a result of one or both of these injuries. Because of common issues of fact and law, these claims were consolidated for purposes of a hearing.
On June 25, 1996, the matter proceeded to hearing before ALJ Rumler on the issues of whether the January 14 injury caused a need for carpal tunnel surgery, and whether the May 21 injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. (Tr. June 25, 1996, p. 12). At the conclusion of the hearing ALJ Rumler orally ruled the claimant failed to prove the May 21 injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The ALJ apparently ruled the carpal tunnel syndrome was compensable, but reserved the issue of whether any depression could be attributed to that condition. (Tr. June 25, 1996, pp. 124, 129). Before another hearing was held, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which was approved by ALJ Harr on August 8, 1996.
In March 1998, the claimant filed an application for hearing seeking additional benefits. On January 19, 2001, claimant’s counsel filed a Motion for Entry of Final Order or for De Novo Hearing. The motion alleged that ALJ Rumler failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the denial of W.C. No. 4-221-429, the claim for the May 21 injuries. The claimant requested entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with § 8-43-215, C.R.S. 2001, or a de novo hearing concerning the compensability of the May 21 injuries. The respondents objected to the motion arguing that the August 1996 full and final settlement encompassed all claims for benefits, and the claimant was not entitled to additional benefits absent proof of fraud or mutual mistake of material fact in the execution of the settlement. Section 8-43-204(1), C.R.S. 2001. The respondents’ objection specifically alleged the claimant’s attorney proposed the settlement, and the settlement was based on ALJ Rumler’s finding “that the back and knee claims were not compensable.”
On June 14, 2001, ALJ Harr denied the claimant’s motion. ALJ Harr’s order contains no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law.
On review, the claimant argues ALJ Harr erred by failing to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying the motion. The claimant also argues that because there was no written order dismissing the claim for the May 21 injuries, that claim remains open and the matter should be set for a new hearing. The respondents reiterate their argument that all claims for benefits, including the claim for the May 21 injuries, were resolved by the August 1996 settlement agreement. Because we conclude the settlement agreement is ambiguous, we set aside ALJ Harr’s June 14 order and remand for further proceedings.
Initially, we agree with the claimant that if the claim for the May 21 benefits was not resolved by the settlement agreement, there has been no final and appealable order entered as required by § 8-43-215. The statute specifically provides that such “written order shall be entered as the final award the administrative law judge or director subject to review as provided in this article.” Until the requisite written order is entered, there is no order for us to review under § 8-43-301, C.R.S. 2001. See Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 721 P.2d 157
(Colo.App. 1986); Wait v. Jan’s Malt Shoppe, 736 P.2d 1265 (Colo.App. 1987).
We infer from ALJ Harr’s order that he agreed with the respondents that the settlement agreement disposed of the claim for the May 21 injuries. Therefore, he concluded the claimant is not entitled to entry of specific findings or a de novo hearing concerning W.C. No. 4-221-429. However, we conclude the settlement agreement is ambiguous and the claimant is entitled to a hearing to determine the scope of the settlement agreement.
Settlement agreements are in the nature of contracts. Consequently, rules governing the construction of contracts apply when interpreting settlement agreements. See Cary v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 867 P.2d 117
(Colo.App. 1993); Piel v. Schlage Lock Co., W.C. No. 4-100-755 (September 20, 1999), aff’d. Piel v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, (Colo.App. No. 99CA1956, July 20, 2000) (not selected for publication).
Interpretation of a contract is an issue of law. Consequently, we may determine whether the settlement agreement is ambiguous independent of ALJ Harr’s order. Fiberglas Fabricators, Inc. v. Klyberg, 799 P.2d 371
(Colo. 1990). When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, we must consider the entire instrument, construe it in a harmonious fashion, and give the words their plain and ordinary meanings. If, after applying these rules, the contract is fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to resolve the ambiguity and effect the intent of the parties. Fiberglass Fabricators, Inc. v. Klyberg, supra; Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1984).
Here, we conclude the settlement agreement is ambiguous concerning whether or not the agreement was intended to resolve one or both of the claims for benefits. Consequently, the matter must be remanded to admit extrinsic evidence to effect the intent of the parties.
The settlement agreement is captioned Stipulation for Full and Final Settlement and Withdrawal of All Claims. However, the only workers’ compensation number affixed above the caption is W.C. No. 4-221-033, or the claim number for the January 1994 hand injury. Other pertinent paragraphs of the settlement agreement are as follows:
1. ANGELO BALACHIO is the Claimant in the above referenced claims.
2. MU ZETA HOUSING CORPORATION and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority are the Respondents in the above-referenced claims.
3. Claimant filed a claim for alleged injuries occurring on or about May 21, 1994. Liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act has been denied by Respondents.
4. The claimed disabilities resulting from these alleged injuries include, but are not limited to, the following: RIGHT HAND. Other claimed disabilities as a result of these alleged injuries, known or unknown, and not named herein, are intended by the parties to be included in this agreement.
5 e. Claimant fully understands and agrees that all alleged claims for compensation benefits against respondents are hereby withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice FOREVER. Claimant accepts these terms because he is desirous of obtaining a lump sum payment and settlement of the case without further litigation.
6. Claimant fully understands that if these alleged claims were not dismissed with prejudice and were found to involve a compensable injury, Claimant may be entitled to certain rights and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Pursuant to this Full and Final Settlement and Withdrawal, Claimant is nonetheless choosing to waive and forever give up his rights to all benefits including but not limited to the following:
In our view, this settlement agreement is ambiguous in several respects. Although the caption refers to a full and final settlement and withdrawal of “all claims,” the only claim number listed above the caption is W.C. No. 4-221-033, the claim for the 1994 hand injury. The first two paragraphs of the settlement agreement refer to the “above-referenced claims.” Once again, it is not clear whether the phrase “above-referenced claims” connotes “all claims” or is restricted to the only specified claim, W.C. No. 4-221-033.
Paragraph 3 of the settlement refers to “injuries occurring on or about” May 21, 1994. However, paragraph 4 states that “disabilities resulting from these alleged injuries include, but are not limited to,” the claimant’s right hand. (Emphasis added). However, the parties agree, and the record reflects, the claimant did not file a claim for injuries to his right hand caused by the May 21 incident. Rather, the right hand conditions were alleged to have been caused by the January 14 injury. Thus, paragraphs 3 and 4 are susceptible of the interpretation that the parties intended to settle both claims, but did so inartfully, or that paragraphs 3 and 4 are inconsistent and, indeed, contradictory.
Paragraph 5 e does not clarify or resolve the issue. Although this provision states the claimant understands that he agrees to withdraw “all alleged claims for compensation,” this provision must be read in the context of the entire document. In light of the previously discussed ambiguities, it is possible the claimant understood that he was withdrawing “all alleged claims for compensation” associated with the January 1994 injury, not all claims for compensation of any type. Similarly, paragraph 6 might be construed as limited to “alleged claims” involving the January 1994 injury, not the May 21 injuries.
Under these circumstances, the matter must be remanded for a hearing at which the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguities concerning the intended scope of the settlement agreement. Once these issues have been resolved, ALJ Harr shall reconsider the claimant’s motion and grant appropriate relief, if any. In reaching this result we should not be understood to express any opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the settlement agreement. That is an issue of fact for determination by the ALJ. Polemi v. Wells, 759 P.2d 796
(Colo.App. 1988).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that ALJ Harr’s order dated June 14, 2001, is set aside, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Robert M. Socolofsky
Copies of this decision were mailed November 6, 2001 to the following parties:
Angelo Balachio, P. O. Box 440931, Aurora, CO 80044-0931
Mu Zeta Housing Corporation, 1531 S. Valentine Way, Lakewood, CO 80228
Legal Department, Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority d/b/a Pinnacol Assurance — Interagency Mail
Frank W. Woulf, Esq., 11100-B E. Mississippi Ave., #300, Aurora, CO 80012 (For Claimant)
Shane A. Wetmore, Esq., 600 17th St., #1600N, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy