No. 03SA356.Supreme Court of Colorado.
June 14, 2004.
Transfer from the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 03CA0772, Adams County District Court, Case No. 96CV1409, Honorable C. Vincent Phelps, Judge.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
No. 03SA356, E-470 v. Revenig: Colorado Constitution Article II, Section15 — Just Compensation — Special Benefits — Takings Compensation Statute— Highway Condemnation — Eminent Domain — Partial Taking
In this highway condemnation case, the Supreme Court holds that the portion of the takings compensation statute, section 38-1-114(2)(d), that provides that up to fifty percent of compensation for property taken for a highway project shall be reduced by the amount of special benefits resulting from the project, does not conflict with the just compensation guarantee of article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. The Supreme Court holds that it is the General Assembly’s prerogative to provide the method for calculating just compensation when a landowner’s property is taken in a condemnation proceeding provided that the method satisfies the constitutional guarantee of just compensation. Additionally, the Supreme Court holds that the trial court’s application of the takings compensation statute in this case did not violate article II, section 15.
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Duncan, Ostrander Dingess, P.C., Robert R. Duncan, Donald M. Ostrander, James Birch, Special Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee.
Grimshaw Harring, P.C., Wayne B. Schroeder, Jody Harper Alderman, Denver, Colorado, Opperman Schell, P.C., William M. Schell, Julie A. Rech, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents-Appellants.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Larry D. Tannenbaum, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Colorado.
En Banc.
JUSTICE BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
INTRODUCTION
[1] In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of a takings compensation statute that requires a trial court to reduce by up to fifty percent an award of compensation for property taken in highway acquisitions by the amount of special benefits to the landowner’s remaining property. We affirm.
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the landowner’s remaining property but also to reduce the landowner’s compensation for the property taken.
[6] The General Assembly may provide the method for calculating just compensation when a landowner’s property is taken in a condemnation proceeding provided that the method satisfies the guarantee of our just compensation clause. Before the taking, the landowner owns the entire property, which includes the value of the remaining property and the value of the land taken. After the taking, the landowner possesses the value of the remaining property plus compensation for the land taken, which shall be reduced by the value of any surplus in special benefits to the remaining property according to the mandate of section 38-1-114(2)(d). In sum, the value of the payment received plus the value of the remaining property possessed by the landowner after the taking, enhanced by the special benefits, is equivalent to the value of the landowner’s property prior to the taking. Thus, section 38-1-114(2)(d) does not conflict with the just compensation guarantee of our constitution because the landowner receives the value of which he has been deprived. Accordingly, we defer to the General Assembly’s method of calculating compensation and hold that this statute is constitutional. [7] In addition, we hold that the trial court’s application of section 38-1-114(2)(d) in this case did not violate article II, section 15. As a result of the taking, the petitioners were owed $1,323,691.15 for the property actually taken and $100,000 for damages to their remaining property, which comes to a total of $1,423,691.15. As compensation, they received a cash payment of $1,126,691.15 and $297,000 in special benefits, for a total of $1,423,691.15 received. Thus, the petitioners received the value of which they had been deprived, as required by article II, section 15 of our constitution. [8] Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court and return this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
[9] Petitioners Steven A. Revenig, trustee, and Howard L. Farkas owned approximately 351 acres of undeveloped land in Aurora, Colorado. Through condemnation proceedings, respondent E-470 Public Highway Authority (“E-470”) subsequently acquired from the petitioners 60.9 acres in fee and 12.6 acres in easements for its highway project.
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interest were at stake. We accepted jurisdiction of the case to determine whether section 38-1-114(2)(d) violates article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.[2]
ANALYSIS Section 38-1-114(2)(d) Does Not Violate Article II, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution
[13] Petitioners argue that section 38-1-114(2)(d), which requires the trial court to reduce a landowner’s compensation for property taken by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property, conflicts with the just compensation guarantee of article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
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violate the just compensation guarantee of article II, section 15). In recent years, we have reaffirmed the definition of just compensation articulated in Alexander. See, e.g., E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. 455Co., 3 P.3d 18, 23 (Colo. 2000); City of Englewood v. Weist, 184 Colo. 325, 331, 520 P.2d 120, 123 (1974). Another recent formulation of our basic test for just compensation is that the landowner “must be put in as good [a] position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.” FowlerIrrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 17 P.3d 797, 802 (Colo. 2001).
[18] Both parties agree that reducing an award of compensation by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property does not, in itself, conflict with the just compensation guarantee in article II, section 15 of our constitution. In 1883, this Court stated that special benefits may be applied to reduce an award of compensation for damages to a landowner’s remaining property, and since that time we have approved this method of calculating damages as a form of just compensation under article II, section 15. City of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 127-28, 2 P. 6, 15 (1883) (“If, by reason of the proximity of the railroad thereto, plaintiff’s property is in any way peculiarly benefited . . ., such benefit should be considered and the value thereof allowed in determining the amount of his compensation.”); see also Boxberger v.State Highway Comm’n, 126 Colo. 526, 534-35, 251 P.2d 920, 925 (1952) (discussing former takings compensation statute that allowed special benefits to be applied to reduce compensation for damages to remaining property, but not compensation for property taken); Denver Joint StockLand Bank v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 105 Colo. 366, 371, 98 P.2d 283, 286(1940) (“The benefits which may be set off against damages, where part of a tract of land, as in the instant case, is taken, are those accruing to the residue of the tract from the construction of the improvement.”). [19] Because special benefits are a valid form of compensation under article II, section 15, just compensation is not, as the petitioners argue, synonymous with a cash payment. The language of article II, section 15, by its terms, does not require cash to be paid for property taken or damaged; rather, it requires that “just compensation” be provided. In construing article II, section 15, this Court has never held that “just compensation” requires payment only in cash. Such a holding would contradict, in principle, over 100 years of precedent affirming special benefits as a form of just compensation when applied to the remaining property.[4] [20] When a landowner’s property is condemned as part of a highway project, the project may result in special benefits, which are specific improvements to the landowner’s remaining property. Such benefits directly increase the fair market value of a landowner’s remaining property, and their value can be calculated with reasonable certainty.See 455 Co., 3 P.3d at 23; Denver Joint Stock Land Bank, 105 Colo. at 371, 98 P.2d at 286; see also State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n. v. Tate, 592 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Mo. 1980) (Special benefits include such improvements as “availability for new or better uses, facilities for ingress and egress, improved drainage, sanitation, [and] flood protection”; “paradigm examples” of special benefits in highway acquisitions are “changes in available uses or in the facilities for direct access.”). [21] In 1987, the Colorado General Assembly adopted a new method of calculating the compensation owed to a landowner in highway acquisitions.[5] Section 38-1-114(2)(d) provides that compensation for property taken for or damaged by a highway project shall be reduced by the amount of any special
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benefits resulting from the project, but not to exceed fifty percent of the total amount of compensation for property taken. If a highway project directly increases the value of the landowner’s remaining property, the trial court shall apply this increased value to reduce the landowner’s compensation for the property that is taken:
[22] § 38-1-114(2)(d). The General Assembly’s new method requires a trial court to apply special benefits not only to reduce the amount of damages to the landowner’s remaining property, which has long been approved as a form of just compensation under article II, section 15, but also to reduce the amount of compensation for property taken, which we have never before tested against our constitutional guarantee of just compensation. [23] Modern highway systems include many features not envisioned within the common understanding of the term “highway” in past generations, such as complex interchanges, high-occupancy vehicle lanes, park-and-ride facilities, and electronic message boards. The General Assembly enacted the takings compensation statute to reflect the complex nature of modern highway systems. In so doing, the General Assembly attempted to strike a balance between the interests of individual landowners whose property is taken and the interests of the taxpaying public. This statute was intended not only to ensure that landowners receive adequate monetary compensation for property taken, but also to allow the monetary compensation to be reduced by a reasonable amount where the price of land in the path of a proposed highway has been increased by virtue of the public improvement. The legislature determined that the value of land in the path of a proposed highway may be driven up by the actions of speculators, who may know the general location of a new highway years in advance of construction. The State Highway Department estimated that by allowing compensation for property taken to be reduced by the value of the special benefits to the remaining property, the impact of land speculation on highway projects could be diminished. See Hearings on S.B. 27 before the Senate Transportation Committee, 56th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Jan. 27, 1987) (statement of State Highway Comm’r Hanavan); Statement on S.B. 27, 56th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 16, 1987) (statement of bill sponsor Rep. Berry before Colo. House of Reps.). It is the General Assembly’s prerogative to balance these interests between the landowner and the taxpaying public in determining the compensation owed to a landowner whose property is taken, provided that its calculus falls within the broad parameters of the Colorado Constitution. [24] Article II, section 15 lists two ways in which a landowner may be deprived of property, either by being “taken” or by being “damaged.” By its terms, the provision does not require different forms of compensation for these different types of property deprivations. Instead, it provides that a single form of compensation, “just compensation,” is required for both takings and damages. [25] When part of a landowner’s property is condemned for a highway project, the results to the landowner are a detriment in the form of a taking of property and, in some cases, a benefit in the form of the increased value of the remaining property.[6] These offsetting consequences to separate parcels arise from a single transaction, the highway project. In addition, these offsetting consequences accrue to a single landowner. As a result, allowing the award of compensation for the property taken to be reduced by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property, even though the offsetting detriment and benefit arise from different parcels, does not conflict with article II, section 15. [26] Before the taking, the landowner owns the entire property, which includes the value of the remaining property and the value of the land taken. After the taking, the landowner[For a highway acquisition], the compensation for the property taken and damages to the residue of said property shall be reduced by the amount of any special benefits which result from the improvement or project, but not to exceed fifty percent of the total amount of compensation to be paid for the property actually taken.
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possesses the value of the remaining property plus compensation for the land taken, which shall be reduced by the value of any surplus in special benefits to the remaining property according to the mandate of section 38-1-114(2)(d). In sum, when an award of compensation for property taken is reduced by the amount of special benefits, the value of the payment received plus the value of the land still possessed by the landowner after the taking, enhanced by the special benefits, is equivalent to the value of the landowner’s property prior to the taking. Thus, the landowner receives “the value of what he has been deprived of, and nothing more.” Alexander, 51 Colo. at 144, 116 P. at 344. In other words, the landowner is placed in “as good [a] position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.” Fowler, 17 P.3d at 802.
[27] Thus, the landowner receives just compensation, and there exists no conflict between the takings compensation statute and article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. Applying both the presumption of constitutionality and the requirement that the landowner must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, we defer to the General Assembly’s method for calculating just compensation in section 38-1-114(2)(d) and hold that this statute is constitutional. [28] Petitioners make three arguments to support the position that just compensation for property taken requires payment only in cash. We are not persuaded. [29] First, petitioners argue that we should follow the majority of states, which do not permit an award of compensation for property taken to be reduced by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property.[7]However, we note that both federal law and a substantial minority of states allow compensation for property taken to be reduced by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property.[8] Although there is a substantial amount of authority on both sides of this issue, our decision does not rest on the reasoning of either the majority or minority approach. Rather, our decision rests on our conclusion that the statute does not conflict with Colorado’s just compensation clause, on the heavy burden of proof necessary to hold the statute unconstitutional, and on deference to the General Assembly’s method for calculating a landowner’s compensation for highway condemnation. [30] Second, petitioners argue that according to our case law construing the just compensation clause, they are entitled to payment only in cash. However, the cases relied on by petitioners stand only for the proposition that they are entitled to compensation for the fair market value of the property taken.[9] In this case, the petitioners received the fair market value of their property, taking into account the special benefits to the remaining property.
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[31] Our conclusion that just compensation does not require payment only in cash is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal just compensation clause.[10] That Court stated that “no decision of this Court holds that compensation other than money is an inadequate form of compensation under eminent domain statutes.”Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 150 (1974). In Baumanv. Ross, the Court addressed the same issue before us now and held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of just compensation does not conflict with reducing compensation for property taken by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property. 167 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1897).[11] In so holding, the Bauman Court rejected the view that cash payment is the only permissible form of just compensation by stating that “the constitution does not require that the value should be paid, but that just compensation should be given.” Id. at 570. [32] Third, petitioners argue that our use of the term “pecuniarily” in dicta in Fowler implies that just compensation requires payment only in cash. Fowler, 17 P.3d at 802 (“[T]he owner must be put in as good [a] position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.”). The term “pecuniarily” means in monetary terms, i.e., in terms of fair market value. See XI Oxford English Dictionary 417 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “pecuniarily” as “in respect of money”). This definition is consistent with our use of the term in Fowler, a case in which the form of compensation for the taking was not in dispute; rather, the case addressed the amount of compensation due a landowner for a temporary taking. 17 P.3d 797. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court case from which we borrowed the quote containing the term “pecuniarily” used it to connote fair market value.[12] Thus, we conclude that Fowler stands for the accepted proposition that a landowner must receive the fair market value of property taken, which the petitioners in this case received in cash plus special benefits.Section 38-1-114(2)(d), as Applied in this Case, Did Not Violate Article II, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution
[33] Having concluded that section 38-1-114(2)(d) does not conflict with the constitutional guarantee of just compensation under article II, section 15, we next consider whether the statute, as applied in this case, violated article II, section 15. A statute that is constitutional on its face may be unconstitutional as applied. People v. Albrecht, 145 Colo. 202, 208, 358 P.2d 4, 8 (1960).
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to their remaining property, leaving a surplus of $197,000 in special benefits. Following section 38-1-114(2)(d), the trial court used this $197,000 surplus to reduce the petitioners’ payment for the property taken.
[35] Petitioners argue that they are entitled to $197,000 in cash in addition to the surplus of $197,000 in special benefits received. However, we have already established that under article II, section 15, the petitioners were entitled to receive the value of which they were deprived and that just compensation is not synonymous with a cash payment. In this case, petitioners received the compensation to which they were entitled. [36] As a result of the taking, the petitioners were owed $1,323,691.15 for the property actually taken and $100,000 for damages to their remaining property, which comes to a total of $1,423,691.15. As compensation, they received a cash payment of $1,126,691.15 and $297,000 in special benefits, for a total of $1,423,691.15 received. Thus, the petitioners received the value of which they had been deprived, as required by article II, section 15 of our constitution.[14] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s application of section 38-1-114(2)(d) to the facts of this case did not violate article II, section 15. Conclusion
[37] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the trial court and return this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Whether the portion of Section 38-1-114(2)(d), C.R.S., which provided that, in highway acquisitions, compensation for the property taken shall be reduced by the amount of any special benefits that result from the improvement or project, but not to exceed fifty percent of the total amount of compensation for the property taken, is unconstitutional, facially and as applied, when tested against article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.
I. Under Colorado Law, the Statute is Unconstitutional
[41] The issue we confront today is a matter of state law, uniquely shaped and mandated by the language of Colorado’s own constitution. Our constitution requires that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation”. Colo. Const. art. II, § 15. Interpreting that constitutional provision, this court has consistently held that just compensation means monetary payment. See Swift v. Smith, 119 Colo. 126, 201 P.2d 609, 615 (1949);Leadville Water Co. v. Parkville Water Dist., 164 Colo. 362, 436 P.2d 659, 660 (1967). Prior to the passage of section 38-1-114(2)(d) and its specific provisions related to highway acquisition, there was no question in Colorado but that special benefits could be set off against damages only, but not against the value of the land taken. Boxberger v. StateHighway Comm’n, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920, 925 (1953); Denver JointStock Land Bank v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283, 286
(1940). The landowner was entitled to the full value, in monetary form, of the land actually taken. Indeed, we have even specifically held that a landowner need not accept substitute benefits in lieu of compensation for property taken. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Ackroyd, 44 Colo. 454, 98 P. 726, 727
(1908); Burlington C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 10 Colo. 178, 14 P. 329, 332 (1887).
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owner of property taken without his consent, and a history of case law that “jealously guard[s]” that right. Lamborn v. Bell, 18 Colo. 346, 32 P. 989, 991-92 (1893).
[43] Despite the majority’s assertions that this court has endorsed non-monetary just compensation in the past, maj. op. at 11-12, no case has ever held that just compensation for property physically taken could be computed other than by dollars paid. In fact, as recently as 2001, this court held that just compensation requires that “the owner must be put in as good position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.” Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 17 P.3d 797, 802 (Colo. 2001) (quoting U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379(1945) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the term pecuniary, as well as its dictionary definition, equates to monetary compensation, not some intangible form of special benefits. See The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1006 (9th ed. 1995) (pecuniary means “of, concerning, or consisting of, money.”). The cases to which the majority cites stand for the proposition that benefits may be offset against damages as to residual property — a completely different concept than the one the majority addresses today. [44] It is, of course, indisputable that this court must defer to the General Assembly and must hold a statute constitutional unless the petitioners are able to demonstrate that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Maj. op. at 8-9. Hence, my inquiry is simply whether this is, as the majority suggests, a matter appropriately conferred to the legislature’s discretion in prescribing the terms, conditions and methods for the evaluation of just compensation, or whether it is a matter that cuts to the heart of just compensation in violation of the constitution. In my view, it is the latter.[15] [45] For that conclusion, I rely upon three precepts: A) landowners are entitled to monetary compensation in Colorado and special benefits do not constitute money; B) section 38-1-114(2)(d) creates disparate and unfair results in measuring compensation; and C) section 38-1-114(2)(d) is arbitrary in that it applies only to highway projects, not to other takings, and it arbitrarily reduces the value of the land taken by up to fifty percent, but not more.
A.
[46] Just compensation means the reasonable market value of the property taken — the price it would bring if sold in the open market. Goldsteinv. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 192 Colo. 422, 560 P.2d 80, 82-83 (1977). Section 38-1-114(2)(d) directs that the monetary condemnation award payable to a landowner whose property is condemned must be reduced by any special benefits attributable to remainder property, up to fifty percent of the total award. The undeniable impact of that statute is to create a situation in which a landowner may receive only one-half of the monetary value of the condemned property. The majority concludes otherwise, relying on cases such as Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897), for the proposition that just compensation need not be monetary, and that, therefore, the increase in value to the landowner’s remaining property may properly be calculated into the total award for purposes of reaching “just” compensation.
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recent times, the Supreme Court itself has specifically equated just compensation to monetary compensation. U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373
(1943) (Just compensation means “the full and perfect equivalent inmoney of the property taken.”) (emphasis added); U.S. v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (stating that “just compensation means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken”); Phillips v. Washington LegalFound., 524 U.S. 156, 177 (1998) (same). The majority’s position today does not conform to this modern trend. Thus, I cannot agree that “federal law and a substantial minority of states allow compensation for property taken to be reduced by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property.” Maj. op. at 18.
The courts reason that imposing upon landowners the deduction associated with uninvited and perhaps never-realized benefits is inconsistent with principles of just compensation. [51] Under the majority’s construction, a landowner is not only required to give up the condemned portion of his property, but would also be forced to sell the remainder property in order to be made whole. Specifically, the landowner recognizes no gain on the remainder property unless or until he sells it. That gain may be illusory; it may
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be over-stated; it may be under-stated. In any event, it does not relate to the property taken, for which the condemning entity owes that landowner just and fair value.
B.
[52] Second, the statute creates unfair outcomes. In a hypothetical situation, three landowners could border the new highway construction project and could experience completely different economic outcomes. If all of landowner A’s property is necessary to the project, he will receive the fair market value of that property free of any deductions. If none of landowner B’s property is necessary to the project, but he will receive a special benefit attributable to the project in the form of an access outlet, he will enjoy the full advantage of that benefit without any negative economic consequences. It is only landowner C, who both has property being taken and also remainder property, who will be forced to pay for the benefit to his remaining property by way of deduction from the fair market value of the property condemned. That outcome, in the words of a New York appellate court, would result in an “unconstitutionally discriminate exercise of taxing power in favor of a neighboring owner who suffers no loss of land, but benefits by the public improvement which led to the taking.” Chiesa v. State, 351 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (N.Y.App.Div. 1974).
C.
[53] Lastly, the statute is inherently arbitrary. It reduces the compensation due to a landowner whose property is being taken for highway construction purposes, while preserving just compensation for other condemnees. The statute begins by providing in pertinent part that:
[54] § 38-1-114(1). [55] The statute goes on, then, to create a series of special exceptions applicable only to highway acquisitions. Only in such context may compensation for the property taken and damages to the residue of the property be diminished by the amount of special benefits attributable to the project. § 38-1-114(2). [56] Nowhere in the constitution do I find an article that creates exceptions for highway acquisition. Just compensation is due to a landowner irrespective of the identity of the condemnor or nature of the purpose for which condemnation is being undertaken. It is not susceptible to different definitions in different contexts, or to an arbitrary floor or ceiling. [57] Similarly, the statute, without any explanation or rationale, provides that the deduction may not exceed fifty percent of the total condemnation award. § 38-1-114(2)(d). Presuming that the purpose of that section is to save tax dollars by reducing highway expenditures or in the alternative to prevent landowners from receiving a windfall, limiting the deduction to fifty percent is not logically related to the achievement of either of these goals. For example, if fifty acres of a 100-acre ranch (with a fair market value of $100,000) was condemned and the other fifty acres remained, but received special benefits in the amount of $100,000, under the majority’s analysis, the landowner is entitled to zero dollars in just compensation “and nothing more.” Maj. op. at 10. However, when the fifty percent deduction rule is applied, the landowner would still receive $50,000 in compensation. Clearly if just compensation can consist of benefits and not dollars, then the landowner should, under the majority approach, receive nothing. The $50,000 would be a windfall. Hence, the arbitrary fifty percent limitation on deductions itself undermines any logicalIn estimating the value of all property actually taken, the true and actual value at such time shall be allowed and awarded. No deduction therefrom shall be allowed for any benefit to the residue of said property. In estimating damages occasioned to other portions of the claimant’s property or any part thereof other than that actually taken, the value of the benefits, if any, may be deducted therefrom. In all cases the owner shall receive the full and actual value of all property actually taken. In case the benefit to the property not actually taken exceeds the damages sustained by the owner to the property not actually taken, the owner shall not be required to pay or allow credit for such excess.
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understanding of the purpose and application of the statute.
II. Conclusion
[58] I read section 38-1-114(2)(d) as a direct affront to Article II, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. It redefines just compensation under the constitution in such a way as to allow non-monetary compensation for a taking, which contravenes decades of this court’s precedent. It further applies that new definition only to landowners whose property is being taken for highway construction, and then creates an artificial maximum amount of the deduction against the condemnation award.
(1917), for a case in which this court reached the conclusion that a statute purporting to deny a landowner his costs similarly violated constitutional requirements of just compensation without any need to define the particular level of constitutional scrutiny.
(Tex.App. 1986); and State v. Smith, 171 P.2d 853 (Wash. 1946).