W.C. Nos. 4-767-757 4-781-580.Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
January 13, 2010.
The claimant and respondent Pinnacol Assurance (Pinnacol) both seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Mottram (ALJ) dated August 14, 2009, that found the claimant was a joint employee of both employers at the time of her industrial injury and determined both were equally liable for the claimant’s injuries arising out of her concurrent employment with both employers. We dismiss both of the petitions for review without prejudice.
The claimant worked as an executive officer for Builders Association. In May 2008, the claimant was approached by Ms. DeClark to work for DeClark Granite. The claimant, out of concern for Builders Association, negotiated an agreement with Ms. DeClark that she would begin working for DeClark Granite for two and one half days per week beginning on July 30, 2008 and later transition to full time employment. The claimant was scheduled to start work for DeClark Granite on July 30, 2008. However, a new tenant of Builders Association had rescheduled an appointment and the claimant agreed to meet the new tenant on July 30, 2008. The claimant met the new tenant at the office of Builders Association. Ms. DeClark drove to the office of Builders Association and met with the claimant to discuss her new job. At the end of the meeting, Ms. Declark asked the claimant to proceed to the office of DeClark Granite to begin learning the business. The claimant agreed to follow Ms. Declark and began shutting down the office for Builders Association. Ms. DeClark proceeded to the parking lot where accidentally her car accelerated backwards and collided with the claimant’s car, pushing it through the front of Builders Association office door, pinning the claimant and causing injuries. The
ALJ concluded DeClark Granite and Builders Association were equally liable for the claimant’s injuries arising out of her concurrent employment with both employers.
The claimant appealed the ALJ’s order contending the ALJ erred in determining the claimant was in “travel status” for DeClark Granite at the time of her injuries. The claimant argues that she was at the office of Builders Association and performing duties for Builders Association when she was struck by the automobile. The respondent Pinnacol, separate and apart from the other parties, petitioned for review of the order contending that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was a joint employee of both employers at the time of her injury.
Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 2009, provides that a party may file a petition to review an “order which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant any benefit or penalty.” Orders which do not meet one of these criteria are interlocutory and not subject to immediate review. Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110 (Colo. App. 2003) Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1989). Generally, orders are not final if they do not fully dispose of the issue presented including the amount of benefits to be paid Bestway Concrete v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1999); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 988 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 1999). In view of these principles we have held that general awards of medical benefits are not final and reviewable absent a ruling concerning the respondents’ liability for specific treatment. See, e.g., Vicic v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., W. C. No. 4-610-968 (May 17, 2005); Tooley v. Johnson and Sons Trucking, W.C. No. 4-376-713 (January 28, 2000).
Here the ALJ found that both employers were liable for the claimant’s reasonable, necessary and related medical benefits and indemnity benefits. The ALJ did deny Builders Association’s request to withdraw their general admission, but we do not view this as awarding benefits and Builders Association has not sought review of that portion of the order. Oxford Chemicals, Inc. v. Richardson, 782 P.2d 843, 846 (Colo. App. 1989) (order may be partially final and reviewable and partially interlocutory). Thus, the portion of the order appealed contains only a general award of medical benefits and no specific award of any indemnity benefits.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that both the claimant’s and respondent Pinnacol’s petitions to review the ALJ’s order dated August 14, 2009 are dismissed without prejudice.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ John D. Baird
______________________________ Thomas Schrant
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
SHARON CRUMP, PAGOSA SPRINGS, CO, (Claimant).
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF PAGOSA SPGS, Attn: KAREN DAVISON, PAGOSA SPRINGS, CO, (Employer).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D FLEWELLING, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
FOGEL KEATING WAGNER POLIDORI SHAFNER, PC, Attn: BRADLEY UNKELESS, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Claimant).
RITSEMA LYON, Attn: CAROL A FINLEY, ESQ., GRAND JUNCTION, CO, (For Respondents).
HALL EVANS, L.L.C., Attn: FRANK M CAVANAUGH, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Other Party).
NATHAN, BREMER, DUMM MYERS, L.L.C, Attn: KAREN R WELLS, ESQ./BEN TRACY, DENVER, CO, (Other Party 2).
PINNACOL ASSURANCE, ATTN: MS JILL JENNINGS, ESQ./NICK BASLER, ESQ., DENVER, CO (Other Party 3).
DECLARK GRANITE AND FABRICATION, INC., ATTN: KATHLEEN CLARK, PAGOSA SPRINGS, CO (Other Party 4).