Court of Appeals No. 11CA1505.Colorado Court of Appeals. Division A.
September 15, 2011.
Crowley County District Court No. 05CV60, Honorable Michael A. Schiferl, Judge.
Plaintiffs petition under C.A.R. 4.2 and section 13-4-102.1, C.R.S. 2011, for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel defendant, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), to provide them with electronic copies of their deposition transcripts so that they can review and correct the transcripts under C.R.C.P. 30(e). We conclude that the question of law presented in this order is not controlling, and therefore deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED AND APPEAL DISMISSED.
Trine Metcalf, P.C., William A. Trine, Boulder, Colorado; Cheryl L. Trine Law Firm, LLC, Cheryl L. Trine, Boulder, Colorado; Deborah Taussig, LLC, Deborah Taussig, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Hall Evans, LLC, Andrew D. Ringel, Gillian Dale, Edmund M. Kennedy, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Gabriel, J., concurs Terry, J., specially concurs
Opinion by JUDGE WEBB.
I. Background
Plaintiffs, 201 present and former inmates of the Crowley County Correctional Facility, seek damages for injuries suffered during a riot in which they did not participate. They allege that CCA, as owner and operator of the facility, was negligent in not preventing or controlling the riot.
CCA has deposed 118 of the plaintiffs and has stated its intention to depose the remainder. During each deposition, the deponent reserved the right to review the transcript and make corrections. CCA has begun purchasing transcripts of these depositions. Along with the original and one copy of each transcript
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purchased, the court reporters have provided CCA with an electronic copy.
Before the trial court, plaintiffs asserted that they are indigent and thus unable to purchase deposition transcripts to review. The approximately 170 plaintiffs who either remain incarcerated, some out of state, or are in halfway houses, further asserted that they cannot travel to court reporters’ offices to review transcripts and make corrections. Solely for purposes of this opinion, we accept these assertions, which CCA did not challenge below.
Based on these assertions, plaintiffs moved the trial court for an order stating that CCA must provide each deponent with an electronic copy of each transcript that it has purchased or will purchase to enable the deponent to review his or her testimony and make corrections pursuant to C.R.C.P. 30(e). The court denied the motion, explaining, “[T]his is clearly a money issue and this Court will not take the work product from the reporter.”
Plaintiffs then moved the trial court for an order authorizing a petition for interlocutory appeal of this ruling. Over CCA’s opposition, the court certified the appeal. It found that the ruling involved a controlling question of law, the resolution of which would
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promote a more orderly disposition of motion practice involving depositions as well as use of depositions at trial.
II. Law
In 2010, the General Assembly enacted section 13-4-102.1, which provides:
(1) The court of appeals, under rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, may permit an interlocutory appeal of a certified question of law in a civil matter from a district court or the probate court of the city and county of Denver if:
(a) The trial court certifies that immediate review may promote a more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; and
(b) The order involves a controlling and unresolved question of law.
(2) A majority of the judges who are in regular active service on the court of appeals and who are not disqualified may, if approved by rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, order that an interlocutory appeal permitted by the court of appeals be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.
To implement the statute, in 2011, our supreme court adopted C.A.R. 4.2, which defines an “unresolved question of law,” but otherwise tracks the statute’s operative language.
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No reported appellate decision has addressed either the statute or the rule. Some of the language in our statute is similar to the federal interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).[1] When a federal law is similar to a Colorado statute, federal cases may be useful, although not determinative, in analyzing comparable language in the Colorado provision. See, e.g., Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125 n. 3 (Colo. 1982). Several states also have such statutes.[2]
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Initially, we conclude that we need not defer to the trial court’s findings regarding the propriety of an interlocutory appeal. Under both the rule and the statute, this court, in its discretion, “may” order that an interlocutory appeal be heard. See Larry H. Miller Corp.-Denver v. Urban Drainage Flood Control Dist., 64 P.3d 941, 946 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[T]he General Assembly’s use of the term `may’ is indicative of a discretionary power to choose among alternatives.”).[3]
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Next, we consider whether interlocutory appeals of discovery orders should uniformly be disallowed. How federal courts of appeals have treated such interlocutory appeals is informative, although not binding.
Where the appeal would address only whether the trial court had abused its discretion in a discovery matter, interlocutory review is generally not allowed.[4] In contrast, where a discovery order
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presents a question of law, such as the availability of a corporation’s attorney-client privilege in litigation against its shareholders, interlocutory review is occasionally granted.[5]
Because this distinction is consistent with the language of our statute and C.A.R. 4.2, we apply it here, in lieu of the more variable case law among states having similar statutes.[6]
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III. Application A. Unresolved Question of Law
The order before us involves the interplay among C.R.C.P. 30(b)(2), 30(e), and 30(f)(2).
• C.R.C.P. 30(b)(2) provides: “Unless the court otherwise orders, the party taking the deposition shall bear the cost of the recording.”
• C.R.C.P. 30(e) provides that upon request, the court reporter must notify the deponent that the transcript is available.Page 9
“Within 30 days of receipt of such notification the deponent shall review the transcript or recording and, if the deponent makes changes in the form or substance of the deposition, shall sign a statement reciting such changes and the deponent’s reasons for making them and send such statement to the officer.”
• Rule 30(f)(2) provides: “Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of the transcript . . . to any party or to the deponent.”
Plaintiffs assert that the controlling and unresolved legal question is: “Are plaintiffs entitled to obtain electronic copies of their depositions from CCA at no charge, as an exception to the rule that a party must obtain copies of deposition transcripts directly from the court reporter?” Thus, if they are correct, the right to review and make changes trumps the obligation to pay before receiving — or at least having access to — a copy of the transcript. But plaintiffs do not assert that these rules afford the trial court discretion to grant the relief they request. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to the same principles that govern statutory interpretation. People v. Shell, 148 P.3d 162, 178 (Colo. 2006).
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We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo See, e.g., People v. Trupp, 51 P.3d 985, 987-88 (Colo. 2002).
While plaintiffs argue that dicta in Schroeder v. United States, 250 F.R.D. 531, 535 (D. Colo. 2008), supports their position, they acknowledge the absence of any reported Colorado appellate case on the issue. Below, in opposing plaintiffs’ motion, CCA did not identify any such case. Nor have we found one.
Therefore, unlike most discovery rulings, we conclude that plaintiffs’ petition raises an unresolved question of law rather than an exercise of trial court discretion. However, while such a question is a necessary condition to interlocutory review, alone it is not sufficient because the question of law must also be “controlling.”
B. Controlling
According to Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2006, at 31 (1970 Supp. 1985), “Ordinarily it is difficult to believe that a discovery order will present a controlling
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question of law.”[7] Hence, because this petition presents only a discovery ruling, and the case law of states to which we might look is diverse, [8] we need not establish a comprehensive definition of “controlling.”
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Instead, we note that the order being challenged does not share any attributes of the “rare case where the issue presented in the context of discovery . . . involves a controlling question of law.”[9] For example, plaintiffs do not present an issue of “widespread public interest.”[10] Nor do they identify parallel litigation that would
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be impacted by an interlocutory ruling.[11] And we do not discern any “extraordinary facts.”[12]
Therefore, we further conclude that the legal issue presented is not controlling.
C. C.A.R. 21
Plaintiffs urge us to accept this appeal based on decisions of our supreme court reviewing discovery disputes under C.A.R. 21 See, e.g., Stone v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 185 P.3d 150, 152 (Colo. 2008) (order that petitioner execute authorizations for the release of her tax records as part of discovery). Such cases are inapposite for three reasons.
First, C.A.R. 4.2(g) states, in part, “No provision of this rule limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21.” This language makes clear that C.A.R. 4.2 is not meant to act as a substitute for C.A.R. 21 review.
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Second, many of these opinions note that the harm from the ruling would not be correctable on appeal. See, e.g., In re Attorney D., 57 P.3d 395, 398 (Colo. 2002) (“Relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion by a lower court where no other remedy would be adequate. Although challenges to discovery rulings are typically the subject of an appeal, it can be appropriate to review discovery orders interlocutorily, by way of original proceeding, where the impact of the ruling would be substantial and incurable at a later time.”) (internal citations omitted). This consideration is not set forth in either section 13-4-102.1 or C.A.R. 4.2. Nor do plaintiffs make this argument.
Third, review under C.A.R. 21 is not subject to the “controlling and unresolved question of law” limitations set forth in section 13-4-102.1 and C.A.R. 4.2. Rather, the supreme court exercises original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 as a matter of its sole discretion. People v. Day, 230 P.3d 1194, 1196 (Colo. 2010).
IV. Conclusion
The petition is denied and the appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE GABRIEL concurs.
JUDGE TERRY specially concurs.
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JUDGE TERRY specially concurring.
I concur in the majority’s result and reasoning. I write separately to address the requirements for certification and acceptance of an interlocutory appeal in a civil case under Colorado’s new civil interlocutory appeal rule.
Under C.A.R. 4.2(b)(1)-(2), three prongs must be met before a trial court may certify, and the court of appeals may accept, interlocutory review of an order in a civil case:
(1) Immediate review of the order may promote a more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; and
(2) the order involves a controlling question of law; and
(3) the controlling question of law is also an unresolved question of law.
C.A.R. 4.2(b)(1)-(2); see also § 13-4-102.1(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2011.
The majority’s opinion addresses only the second and third of these requirements, namely, whether the trial court’s order involves a controlling question of law and whether that question is unresolved. The fact that any one of these prongs cannot be
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satisfied here justifies denial of the petition, without regard to whether the others can be met.
Trial courts considering certification of orders under C.A.R. 4.2 should be cognizant of each of these three prongs, and should specifically address each of them in any order granting certification. Future petitioners should also separately address each prong in their petitions.