W.C. No. 4-156-310Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
June 5, 1996
FINAL ORDER
The pro se claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ) which determined that the claimant failed to sustain his burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury on May 15, 1990, due to employment stress. Therefore, the ALJ denied and dismissed the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.
Former § 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.), which governs this claim, provides that where the claim is by reason of mental or emotional stress, the claimant is only entitled to compensation if the claimant proves all of the conditions set forth in subsection (2)(a)-(d). Insofar as pertinent, subsection 8-41-301(2)(c) requires the claimant to prove that:
“[T]he claim of emotional or mental stress cannot be based, in whole or in part, upon facts and circumstances that are common to all fields of employment.”
Here, the ALJ found, and the claimant concedes that the Department of Social Services (Department) has a rigid, or “bureaucratic” system for hiring, promoting, transferring and demoting employees. Furthermore, the claimant agrees with the ALJ’s finding that these circumstances are not uncommon to all fields of employment.
However, the claimant alleges that his stress did not result from the Department’s “generic employment practices.” Rather, the claimant argues that his stress was the result of the Department’s application of “the normal work-place processes,” in a manner which was allegedly “illegal, discriminatory, harassing, subversive, and outright illegal.” Therefore, the claimant argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the cause of the claimant’s stress was due to factors common to all fields of employment. We perceive no error.
Our authority to review of the ALJ’s order is limited by the provisions of § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.). Accordingly, we may not interfere with the ALJ’s findings of fact unless the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact-finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion, without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Durocher v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 905 P.2d 4 (Colo.App. 1995).
Furthermore, insofar as the evidence is subject to conflicting inferences, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings which reflect a plausible inference under the totality of the circumstances, and may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra; Lantern Inn v. Industrial Commission, 624 P.2d 929 (Colo.App. 1981). In so doing, we must also defer to the ALJ’s determinations concerning the credibility of the witnesses, and his assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence he found persuasive. Delta Drywall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 868 P.2d 1155 (Colo.App. 1993).
In this case, the ALJ found that the claimant experienced work-related stress. However, the ALJ was not persuaded by the claimant’s theory concerning the cause of the stress. Rather, the ALJ found that at least part of the claimant’s stress was the result of actions by the Department in promoting, demoting and transferring the claimant which were taken in good faith, and did not involve discrimination.
We have reviewed the ALJ’s findings of fact and the record. Contrary to the claimant’s contention, there is substantial albeit conflicting evidence to support the ALJ’s factual determinations. Therefore, the ALJ’s findings must be upheld Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983). Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that the claim is based in part, upon facts and circumstances that are common to all fields of employment is fatal to the claim.
The claimant’s other arguments have been considered and do not alter our conclusion. For example, the ALJ is not required to make findings on every piece of evidence, just the evidence he considered persuasive and determinative of the issues Crandall v. Watson-Wilson Transportation System, Inc., 171 Colo. 329, 467 P.2d 48 (1970). Therefore, the claimant’s contention that the ALJ failed to cite the evidence which the claimant believes sports his theory, is not reversible error.
Similarly, even unrefuted medical evidence is not binding on the ALJ. Casa Bonita Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, 624 P.2d 1340 (Colo.App. 1981). Accordingly, to the extent that the opinions of Dr. Christopher, Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Veronda and Dr. Supple were “unrefuted,” the ALJ was not compelled to credit them.
We also recognize the claimant’s contention that the ALJ erred in crediting the testimony of the employer’s witnesses, Richard Foco and Dr. Gutterman. However, based upon this record, we cannot say that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in crediting their testimony. See Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986). Therefore, the claimant has failed to establish grounds which afford us a basis on which to set aside the ALJ’s order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated June 12, 1995, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
____________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacatethis Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for reviewwith the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon theIndustrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, withintwenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant tosection 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed June 5, 1996 to the following parties:
Jacie Espinoza, 1441 St. Paul St., No. 301, Denver, CO 80206
Dept. of Social Services, Attn: Lynn Moran, 1575 Sherman St., Ste. 1, Denver, CO 80203-1714
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Janie Castaneda, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Paul David Feld, Esq. Joel M. Pollack, Esq., 999 18th St., Ste. 3100, Denver, CO 80202 (For the Respondents)
BY: _______________________