W.C. No. 4-354-260Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
May 24, 2000
ORDER OF REMAND
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) insofar as it denied and dismissed the claim for permanent total disability benefits. We remand the matter for a determination of whether the claimant filed a timely request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The hearing was held on May 19, 1999. On June 8, 1999, the ALJ entered a summary order denying the claim for permanent total disability benefits. The summary order was mailed to the parties on June 9, 1999. The file contains the claimant’s Request for Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with a certificate of mailing indicating that the request was mailed to the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 24, 1999. The request bears a stamp: “RECEIVED JUN 25 1999 Div. of Admin Hearings.”
Section 8-43-215, C.R.S. 1999, provides that: “Any party dissatisfied with a summary order may request specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing within fifteen days after the date of the certificate of mailing of the summary order.” Failure to request specific findings within the statutory time limit is jurisdictional and mandates dismissal of the appeal Reed v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 99CA0084, January 20, 2000). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 99CA0963, March 2, 2000), the court held that a “request” for specific findings is not made until the request is received by the Division of Administrative Hearings and that “mailing of the request does not suffice to effect a request.” Slip. op. at 4. Jurisdiction may not be waived or destroyed by consent, nor may it be conferred by estoppel. Hasbrouck v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 780 (Colo.App. 1984).
Here, the claimant’s request for specific findings of fact was untimely unless received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on or before June 24, 1999. The date stamp indicating that the request was not received until June 25, 1999, creates a factual issue concerning whether or not the claimant filed a timely request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because we lack authority to conduct hearings and make findings of fact, the matter must be remanded to the ALJ with directions to determine whether the claimant filed a timely request for specific findings of fact conclusions of law. The ALJ may hold a hearing, if necessary, to resolve any disputed factual issues. Once the ALJ determines the timeliness of the request for specific findings, he may dismiss the claimant’s appeal or transmit the matter to us for review of the substantive issue.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the matter is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
Copies of this decision were mailed May 24, 2000
to the following parties:
Son Chu, 3669 Overton St., Colorado Springs, CO 80910
Sealy, Inc., P. O. Box 39964, Denver, CO 80239-0964
Wendy Stalkfleet, Continental Casualty Company, P. O. Box 17369 T. A., Denver, CO 80217
William A. Alexander, Jr., Esq., 3608 Galley Rd., Colorado Springs, CO 80909-4349 (For Claimant)
Robert H. Coate, Esq., 1225 17th St., #2800, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: A. Pendroy