W.C. No. 4-004-922Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 24, 1995
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Wells (ALJ), which denied his claim for disability resulting from a heart attack. We affirm.
The ALJ, crediting the opinion of Dr. Vigoda, found that the claimant’s heart attack was not the result of “unusual exertion” arising out of the claimant’s employment, or “mental or emotional stress” resulting from the claimant’s employment. Instead, the ALJ determined that the heart attack was caused by the claimant’s pre-existing atherosclerosis.
On review, the claimant contends that the evidence establishes a compensable claim for “mental or emotional stress” under former §8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.), or alternatively, a compensable claim for a heart attack under § 8-41-302(2), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.). In particular, the claimant asserts that the ALJ should have credited his testimony, and that of Dr. Blonder, rather than relying on the testimony of Dr. Vigoda. We reject this argument.
Initially, we need not consider whether, under the circumstances, the claimant was required to prove the elements of a stress claim under §8-41-301(2) in addition to the elements of a claim for a heart attack under § 8-41-302(2). Regardless of whether this is a claim based on stress or a heart attack, or both, the claimant was required to prove that there was a causal connection between the employment and the disability. Former § 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.); 8-41-302(2); Kinninger v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 759 P.2d 766 (Colo.App. 1988).
The question of causation is one of fact for resolution by the ALJ F. R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985). Consequently, we must uphold the ALJ’s finding that there was no causal relationship between the claimant’s employment and the heart attack if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.). In applying the substantial evidence test, it is the ALJ’s province to assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. See Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Even undisputed testimony is not binding on the ALJ. Cary v. Chevron, Inc., U.S.A., 867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993).
Here, Dr. Vigoda testified that the claimant’s heart attack was most probably caused by his pre-existing atherosclerosis, and not any of the stressors or exertions the claimant allegedly experienced at work. The ALJ was free to credit this testimony, and was not obliged to accept the conflicting testimony of the claimant or Dr. Blonder. The mere existence of a conflict in the evidence affords no basis for relief on appeal. May D F v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo.App. 1988). Thus, the order must be upheld, and we need not consider the additional arguments raised by the claimant.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order, dated October 17, 1994, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEAL PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Bill Whitacre
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order iscommenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver,Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, withservice of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Officeand all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Orderwas mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed October 24, 1995 to the following parties:
Tyrone Rankins, 7355 Songbird Dr., Colorado Springs, CO 80911
Werner Enterprises, 9239 Highway 85, Henderson, CO 68137
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: C. Boyd, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
William A. Alexander, Jr., Esq., 3608 Galley Rd., Colorado Springs, CO 80909-4349 (For the Claimant)
By: _________________________