W.C. No. 4-351-679Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
March 17, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Erickson (ALJ) which determined that the claimant sustained a compensable injury and awarded temporary disability and medical benefits. The respondents contend that the claimant’s injury is not compensable because it was not the result of a “special hazard” of employment, but was instead the product of a preexisting idiopathic disease. We affirm.
The claimant suffers from a connective tissue disease known as scleroderma, and the related condition of Raynaud’s syndrome. Raynaud’s syndrome causes the small blood vessels of the fingers to undergo vasospasm, which in turn may cause “digital occlusions.” It is undisputed that the claimant’s scleroderma and Raynaud’s syndrome are unrelated to her employment.
On July 18, 1997, the claimant’s office was usually cold because an air conditioner was malfunctioning. The ALJ credited expert medical opinion that cold temperatures, superimposed on preexisting Raynaud’s syndrome, can trigger vasospasm and occlusion of the digital arteries. Consequently, the ALJ found that the claimant’s work environment caused her to develop disabling digital occlusions.
In awarding benefits, the ALJ explicitly rejected the respondents’ contention that the claimant was required to prove that the low temperature in her work area constituted a “special hazard” of employment. The ALJ held that the claimant was not required to prove a special hazard because the precipitating cause of the digital occlusions was the work environment, not the preexisting disease process.
On review, the respondents reiterate the argument that the claimant was required to prove a special hazard. The respondents argue that without such proof, the claimant failed to show the requisite causal connection between her employment and the injury. We disagree.
It is true that the claimant’s injury must arise out of the employment to be compensable. Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 1998. This requirement exists to insure that there is a causal relationship between the duties of the employment and the injury. Ordinarily, the question of whether an injury arose out of employment is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Lori’s Family Dining, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 907 P.2d 715 (Colo.App. 1995).
The causation element is satisfied if the evidence shows that the claimant’s injury was initiated or precipitated by the conditions of employment. This is true even if the employment-related cause aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting disease or infirmity so as to produce the disability. H H Warehouse v. Vicory, 805 P.2d 1167 (Colo.App. 1990) (claimant’s treatment for cancer held compensable where sudden opening of a door caused the claimant to move his arm, fracture the bone, and accelerate preexisting cancer).
A second class of compensable injuries exists where the initiating or precipitating cause of the injury is a preexisting disease or idiopathic condition. In these cases, the causation element is satisfied if the claimant proves that the conditions or circumstances of the employment presented a “special hazard” which increased the risk or the extent of the injury. National Health Laboratories v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 844 P.2d 1259
(Colo.App. 1992); Ramsdell v. Horn, 781 P.2d 150 (Colo.App. 1989). Conditions which are ubiquitous, such as floors, do not constitute special hazards of employment for purposes of compensability. Gates Rubber Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 705 P.2d 6 (Colo.App. 1985).
Applying these principles here, we find no error in the ALJ’s order. The ALJ determined, on substantial evidence, that a malfunctioning air conditioner in the claimant’s office lowered the air temperature to an unusual degree. The low temperature acted on the Raynaud’s syndrome so as to trigger vasospams, and finally the digital occlusions. Thus, the initiating or precipitating cause of the claimant’s injury was a condition of the claimant’s employment, not the preexisting Raynaud’s syndrome. The mere fact that the cold temperature acted on the preexisting Raynaud’s syndrome did not require the claimant to prove a “special hazard” in order to establish compensability. H H Warehouse v. Vicory, supra.
Insofar as the respondents made other arguments, we find them to be without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated July 16, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed MARCH 17, 1999
to the following parties:
Jane Baer, 5453 West Canyon Trail, Littleton, CO 80123
Rocky Mountain Health/Columbia Swedish Medical Center, 720 S Colorado Blvd, Suite 1260S, Denver, CO 80246-1904
Lucy Arguello, Alexsis Risk Management Service, 1515 Arapahoe Street, Tower 1 Suite 410, Denver, CO 80202
Darrell Urban, Columbia HCA, PO Box 555, Nashville, TN 37202-0555
Michael A Perales, Esq., 999 18th Street, Suite 3100, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondents)
BY: _______________