No. 96SA346Supreme Court of Colorado.
November 18, 1996
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court, Jefferson County, Honorable William P. DeMoulin, Judge.
RULING REVERSED
David J. Thomas, District Attorney, First Judicial District, Donna Skinner Reed, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Golden, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Vincent C. Todd, Lakewood, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.
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EN BANC
CHIEF JUSTICE VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the People seek review of an order entered by the Jefferson County District Court finding no probable cause for the arrest of the respondent, Jason Cappelli (Cappelli). We reverse the trial court’s ruling. I.
[2] On March 12, 1996, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Sergeant Stephen White (Sergeant White) of the Lakewood Police Department responded to a dispatch for a grass/brush fire located in a drainage area of open space in the Green Mountain area. Upon arriving at the site, Sergeant White, Agent Mike Monn (Agent Monn), and Agent Richard Halpin (Agent Halpin) found a grass fire which they were able to extinguish. Sergeant White characterized the fire as suspicious in origin because there had been no lightning storms in the area and there were no other obvious causes of the fire. At the same time, another small fire was in progress to the north of the drainage area. That fire was contained and extinguished by members of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department.
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at a nearby Veterans’ Administration (VA) Building. Agent Rosenoff proceeded to the VA Building and observed a person on the ledge of the building. Agent Rosenoff identified the person on the ledge as the same person she had just encountered near the residence. She also later identified that person as Cappelli.
[9] Agent Greg Sloter (Agent Sloter) responded to the VA Building, and he was accompanied by a K-9 dog trained to assist in the control and apprehension of humans.[1] After Cappelli made a series of evasive moves on the ledges of the VA Building, Cappelli, Agent Sloter, and the dog ended up on the roof of the building. Agent Sloter, who was in full uniform, warned Cappelli by stating, “Stop what you’re doing or I’ll send the dog.” Cappelli responded by throwing his leather jacket off the roof, taking an aggressive fighting stance with his fists up, and telling Agent Sloter to “[s]end the dog.” As the individuals advanced toward each other, the leashed dog lunged and bit Cappelli on his chest. Cappelli struck the dog, then ran to the edge of the roof and threatened to jump. Cappelli jumped down to a ledge, then submitted to custody. [10] Upon a search of the brown leather jacket which Cappelli had thrown off the roof, agents found a cigarette lighter. Cappelli was taken to the hospital where he was given an injection, presumably for the dog bite. Cappelli was subsequently taken to the Jefferson County Detention Facility, where he entered the booking process at 2:50 a.m. on the morning of March 13, 1996. At that time, Agent Damian Cappello (Agent Cappello) advised Cappelli of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966). Upon the completion of the Miranda advisement, Cappelli agreed to talk to law enforcement personnel. When asked why he started fires and stayed around to harass police officers, Cappelli responded, “That’s what I do.” Cappelli also admitted that he was the person yelling at Sergeant White and the other agents while they were extinguishing the fire in the drainage area. Later, when Cappelli heard one officer tell another officer that Cappelli was being charged with second degree arson, Cappelli volunteered, “Why are they charging me with second degree arson this time? Last time I started a brush fire, they only charged me with fourth degree arson.” [11] Cappelli was subsequently charged with criminal attempt second degree assault, resisting arrest, obstructing a peace officer, second degree arson, fourth degree arson, and second degree criminal trespass. On September 4, 1996, the district court held a hearing to resolve issues raised by Cappelli’s motion to suppress. The district court ruled that the law enforcement officers did not have probable cause to arrest Cappelli and therefore suppressed: (a) all statements made by Cappelli as a result of interviews conducted after the arrest; and (b) the cigarette lighter obtained as a result of the search incident to the arrest. The People subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal.
II.
[12] To be valid, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. People v. Washington, 865 P.2d 145, 147 (Colo. 1994). Probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that a crime has been or is being committed by the person arrested. Id. In determining whether there is probable cause to arrest, the totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest must be considered. Id. As the term suggests, probable cause deals with probabilities, not certainties, and it is sufficient if the officer reasonably believed that the person arrested committed a crime. Id. Although we will not ordinarily disturb a trial court’s finding that probable cause to arrest was lacking, we will do so when the record compels the conclusion that probable cause to arrest existed. Id.
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individual, they may acquire probable cause to arrest if the individual commits other crimes while attempting to elude them. See People v. Smith, 870 P.2d 617, 619 (Colo.App. 1994). In Smith, the police were searching a neighborhood for a male suspect on a motorcycle. A police officer engaged in the search observed a passing Cadillac with a broken rear window. The officer believed that the person the police were looking for might have abandoned the motorcycle and stolen the Cadillac. Accordingly, the officer activated his emergency lights in an attempt to pull the Cadillac over, but the vehicle sped off. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that even if the officer had unlawfully tried to stop the defendant, the defendant’s response in attempting to elude the officer constituted new, distinct crimes for which there was probable cause to arrest. Id.
[14] The issue before us is whether law enforcement personnel had probable cause to arrest Cappelli without a warrant under the circumstances of this case. While the agents were extinguishing the fire in the drainage area, a person yelled obscenities such as “You [expletive] will never catch me,” which indicated to Sergeant White that the person had deliberately caused the fire. According to Agent Monn, who had previous contact with Cappelli, the yelling person’s voice sounded like that of Cappelli. Agent Monn’s identification of the voice, the agents’ information that Cappelli was suspected of causing previous fires, and the close proximity of Cappelli’s residence to the current fire caused the agents to air Cappelli’s name as a suspect in this case. When Agent Rosenoff and Agent Halpin encountered Cappelli late at night[2] after hearing his name aired as a suspect for arson, they had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. See People v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1989) (holding that only reasonable suspicion is necessary to support an investigatory stop).[3] However, before the agents could stop Cappelli, he ran away despite being told to “freeze.” [15] After eluding the agents, Cappelli climbed over a six foot fence and climbed to the roof of a VA Building. There, he encountered Agent Sloter and assumed an aggressive fighting stance. Cappelli then attempted to run away once more by jumping off the roof to a ledge below. These actions by Cappelli provided Agent Sloter with a reasonable belief that, at a minimum, Cappelli had (a) trespassed, (b) committed criminal attempt second degree assault, and (c) resisted arrest. Thus, the facts and circumstances here were sufficient to support a reasonable belief by Agent Sloter that Cappelli had committed various crimes while attempting to run away, thereby providing probable cause to arrest Cappelli. See Smith, 870 P.2d 617.[4] III.
[16] We hold that based on the totality of the circumstances of this case, the record compels the conclusion that the agents had probable cause to arrest Cappelli. We therefore reverse the district court’s order suppressing the statements Cappelli made after the arrest and the cigarette lighter found in Cappelli’s jacket.
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