W.C. Nos. 3-946-929 4-184-275Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
November 25, 1996
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) which denied and dismissed his petition to reopen or set aside a settlement agreement. We affirm.
The claimant suffered two compensable injuries during his employment for the respondent-employer (Westin), and applied for a hearing on the issue of permanent total disability. Prior to the hearing, the claimant entered into a “Stipulation” for the full and final settlement of both injuries, in exchange for a lump sum payment of $70,000. The settlement also provided that the claimant waived his right to reopen the claims for any reason except on the grounds of fraud or mutual mistake of material fact. The settlement was approved by the Division of Workers’ Compensation (Division) on May 26, 1995.
At the time of the settlement, the claimant was receiving periodic permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $300 per week, pursuant to a Corrected Final Admission of Liability in W.C. No. 3-946-929. Further, the claimant had previously received a lump sum payment of permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $10,000.
Following the respondents’ $70,000 payment under the terms of the settlement, the claimant received no further periodic permanent partial disability benefits. Claiming an error or mistake concerning his entitlement to additional permanent partial disability benefits, the claimant petitioned to reopen the settlement.
At a hearing before the ALJ, the claimant argued that the settlement should be “canceled” or “set aside” because there was no “meeting of the minds” concerning whether the claimant was entitled to receive the balance of permanent partial disability benefits for which Westin admitted liability in its Corrected Final Admission of Liability. The claimant also asserted that the settlement was based upon a mutual mistake of fact concerning whether he would receive the balance of permanent partial disability benefits as provided by the Corrected Final Admission of Liability. In support, claimant’s counsel stated:
“[W]hen I signed off on the documents and my client signed off . . . , it was our understanding that the permanent partial disability payment would continue and that any future payment issues, anything in the future would cease as a result of the full and final settlement. There was no discussion between [Westin’s attorney] and myself regarding that specific issue. [Westin’s attorney] had the understanding we were settling on a full and final basis, and I guess it is an interpretation as to what full and final means under the circumstances.” (Tr. p. 3).
Based upon the claimant’s offer of proof, which was consistent with the factual assertions by claimant’s counsel, the ALJ determined that the claimant failed to establish a “mutual” mistake of a material fact. (Tr. pp. 21, 22). Further, the ALJ determined that there was nothing in the settlement to indicate that the claimant was entitled to the continued payment of permanent partial disability benefits after the settlement, and that the claimant’s proffered testimony to the contrary did not entitle the claimant to set aside the settlement. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the claimant failed to establish grounds to reopen or set aside the claim.
On appeal, the claimant renews his argument that there is no valid contract and thus, the settlement should be “vacated.” We disagree.
The interpretation of a written settlement agreement is a question of law. Cary v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993). If the language used in the written instrument is plain, clear and no absurdity is involved, a court must enforce the instrument as written. Cary v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., supra; Three G. Corp. v. Daddis, 714 P.2d 1333 (Colo.App. 1986).
In this matter, we agree with the ALJ’s determination that the settlement agreement is plain, clear and no absurdity is involved. Therefore, the ALJ correctly concluded that the agreement must be enforced as written. The settlement states that the claimant “rejects, waives, and forever gives up the right to claim any benefits to which he might be entitled” to receive in connection with the injuries. (Emphasis in original). The agreement contains no language suggesting that the claimant is entitled to continuing permanent partial disability benefits. To the contrary, the agreement expressly stated that the claimant “is giving up the rights” to both medical impairment benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. The agreement also indicates the claimant’s understanding that after the Division has approved the settlement, the claims shall be dismissed “with prejudice.” In light of these provisions, we are not persuaded, as the claimant argues, that further language was necessary which specifically indicated that the permanent partial disability benefits claimant was receiving would stop.
Accordingly, the claimant’s entitlement to relief from the settlement agreement is governed by § 8-43-204, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). That statute provides that once a settlement agreement has been approved by the Division, no relief may be granted in the absence of fraud or a mutual mistake of material fact. See also §8-43-303(1), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.); Powderhorn v. Weaver, 835 P.2d 616 (Colo.App. 1992). The claimant does not allege fraud, and the determination of whether the claimant has proven a mutual mistake of material fact is a question of fact for the ALJ Maryland Casualty Co. v. Buckeye Gas Products Co., 797 P.2d 11
(Colo. 1990). It follows that we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ’s plausible inferences drawn from the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Here, the record supports the ALJ’s determination that the claimant’s proffered testimony only established a “unilateral” mistake of fact concerning his right to further permanent partial disability benefits. Therefore, we may not disturb the ALJ’s order denying the petition to reopen. Renz v. Larimer County School District Poudre R-1, ___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 95CA1300, June 27, 1996).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated April 16, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ Kathy E. Dean
______________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate thisOrder is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14thAvenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with thecourt, with service of a copy of the petition upon the IndustrialClaim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20)days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to section8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed November 25, 1996 to the following parties:
Charles W. Rice, 3453 S. Grant, Englewood, CO 80110
Sophia Rodriguez, Cherry Creek Inn, 600 S. Colorado Blvd., Denver, CO 80222
Susan Repko, Gallagher Bassett Services, 7935 E. Prentice Ave., Ste. 305,
Englewood, CO 80111
Subsequent Injury Fund — Interagency Mail
Karen R. Wells, Esq., 3900 E. Mexico, Ste. 1000, Denver, CO 80210 (For the Respondents)
Amado L. Cruz, Esq., 6000 E. Evans Ave., Ste. 1-428, Denver, CO 80222 (For the Claimant)
Attorney General’s Office, 1525 Sherman St., 5th Flr., Denver, CO 80203 (For SIF)
BY: _______________________