W.C. No. 4-145-583Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
October 9, 1997
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Chief Administrative Law Judge Felter (ALJ) which awarded continuing medical benefits after maximum medical improvement (MMI). The claimant contends that the ALJ erred insofar as he did not award future psychiatric treatment. We disagree, and therefore, affirm.
The ALJ found that the claimant sustained his burden to prove a need for medical treatment after MMI. Crediting Dr. Ryan’s report dated September 9, 1996, Dr. Britton’s report dated November 4, 1993, and Dr. Scaer’s report dated May 23, 1996, the ALJ found that a one year extension of the claimant’s health club membership is reasonable and necessary to cure and relieve the claimant from the effects of an industrial knee injury. However, the ALJ was not persuaded that the claimant needs further psychiatric treatment. (Tr. p. 19); CAN-USA Construction, Inc. v. Gerber, 767 P.2d 765 (Colo.App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, at 783 P.2d 269 (1989) (the ALJ’s oral findings may be considered to interpret the ALJ’s written findings). Consequently, the ALJ awarded future medical benefits consisting of a one year health club membership.
On review, the claimant argues that the record compels an award of future psychiatric treatment. In support, the claimant contends that medical evidence which the ALJ credited concerning her need for a health club membership also supports an award of future psychiatric treatment. The claimant also contends that the need for ongoing psychiatric treatment is supported by the medical report of Dr. McCrainey. We disagree.
A claimant is entitled to medical benefits after MMI if the claimant presents substantial evidence that future medical treatment will be reasonably necessary to relieve the effects of the injury or prevent future deterioration. Grover v. Industrial Commission, supra; Stollmeyer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 609 (Colo.App. 1995). Insofar as the claimant requests a specific form of Grover type medical benefits, it is the ALJ’s sole prerogative as the fact finder to determine whether that type of treatment is reasonably necessary. Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office,
___ P.2d ___ (Colo.App. No. 96CA0679, February 6, 1997) cert. denied, September 15, 1997.
Because the issue is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1997. Stollmeyer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Furthermore, our application of the substantial evidence test requires that we defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, his resolution of conflicts in the evidence and his assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Suetrack USA v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 902 P.2d 854 (Colo.App. 1995)
Admittedly, Dr. Britton recommended that the claimant receive “continued available support from Dr. Robinson” the treating psychologist. However, the ALJ was not required to credit Dr. Britton’s opinion concerning the claimant’s need for additional psychiatric treatment, and instead, only credited Dr. Britton’s opinion concerning the claimant’s need for a continuing health club membership. See (Finding of Fact 5); Colorado Springs Motors, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 504, 441 P.2d 21 (1968) (ALJ may credit all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony).
Furthermore, it is true that Dr. Ryan’s report dated September 9, 1996, contains a lengthy discussion of the claimant’s psychiatric impairment. Nevertheless, Dr. Ryan did not expressly recommend further psychiatric treatment. Instead, Dr. Ryan recommended an extension of the claimant’s health club membership and stated that, “I do not think that anything else is likely to be necessary to maintain her at MMI.” The claimant’s arguments notwithstanding, this evidence supports the ALJ’s inference that the “only thing” the claimant established was a need for an extension of her health club membership. (Tr. p. 19).
Similarly, even though Dr. Scaer recommended additional rehabilitation work at a health club, he did not recommend any further psychiatric treatment. To the contrary, Dr. Scaer reported that, at the time of his examination, the claimant denied “any depression, loss of appetite, psychosocial withdrawal, or mood changes associated with injury associated psychological dysfunction and in fact feels that she is psychological [sic] healthy.” Therefore, we reject the claimant’s argument that the medical evidence the ALJ found persuasive compels an award of future psychiatric treatment.
Moreover, because the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, it is immaterial whether the record contains medical evidence, which if credited, might support the award sought by the claimant. See F.R. Orr Construction v. Rinta, 717 P.2d 965 (Colo.App. 1985) (substantial evidence is probative evidence which would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony or contrary inferences). Therefore, the claimant has failed to establish grounds which afford us a basis to disturb the ALJ’s award.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s order dated February 24, 1997, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify orvacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals,2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition forreview with the court, with service of a copy of the petitionupon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties,within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed,pursuant to section 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1997.
Copies of this decision were mailed October 9, 1997 to the following parties:
Joyce P. Contreras, 4517 Driftwood Pl., Boulder, CO 80301
Advanced Forming Technology, Inc., 2150 Miller Dr., Longmont, CO 80501-6744
Sarah Mays, Sedgwick James of Colorado, Inc., P.O. Box 101268, Denver, CO 80250-1268
John G. Taussig, Jr., Esq., 1919 14th St., Ste. 805, Boulder, CO 80302 (For the Claimant)
Bonnie J. McLaren Esq., William A. Richardson, Esq., 1430 Larimer Square, #400, Denver, CO 80202 (For the Respondent)
BY: _______________________